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RECENT DECISIONS
benefit and that such benefit was the motivating reason for the
transportation. The court placed much importance on the fact that the
two sons of the defendants went along on the trip and that the share of
expenses remained one-half each. It appears that had there been a
sharing of the expenses in proportion to numbers, the plaintiff would
be barred from recovery by the guest statute.
The advisability of adopting a similar statute in Wisconsin has been
discussed in the MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW. It notes, 3
"... These statutes generally limit the host's liability to cases
of gross negligence. Consequently, they put at rest a great deal
of legislation. They are real measures of economy in the cost of
maintaining the judiciary. They are also a wholesome social
influence in maintaining and encouraging a generous and
altruistic relationship between those blessed with an automobile
and those who cannot afford to own one. The subject recom-
mends itself to legislative consideration."
The failure of the legislature to adopt a guest statue in Wisconsin leads
us to assume that it deems such action unnecessary. A search of the
State Law Index reveals that at present a guest statute in some form is
in force in twenty-five states' 4 and that a majority of these statutes were
enacted between the years of 1933 and 1936 when the automobile began
to fill the nation's highways. The Index also discloses that the last of
these was enacted in 1939 and that none has been enacted since. Thus,
the Wisconsin legislature may have acted wisely in not adopting a guest
statute, as it appears that the present legal machinery governing the
actions by a guest against his host is superior to that of the law proposed.
DONALD M. LOWRY
Sales - Time Condition in Contract for Removal of Growing
Crop -A third party sold and conveyed certain lands to the de-
fendants and sold to the plaintiffs nursery stock growing thereon.
Plaintiffs and defendants then entered into a contract providing that
plaintiffs should have the right to enter upon the land in question at any
time until October 30, 1949, to remove the said nursery stock; that
defendants would not damage, destroy or remove the stock prior to that
date; and that plaintiffs could cultivate the stock up to, and would leave
the land in good condition on, that date. Without excuse, except for
illness immediately prior to October 30, 1949, plaintiffs failed to remove
the stock before the day specified. However, they were ready, willing
and able to do so three days later, and at all times thereafter, but
13 Meissner, Harry V., Liability of Automobile Drivers to Gratuitous Passengers
Under the Wisconsin Law, 18 MARQ. L. R. 3, 19 (1933).
14 Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Ill., Ind., Idaho, Kan., Ky., Mont., Neb., Nev.,
N.M., N.D., Ohio, Ore., S.C., S.D., Tex., Utah, Va., Vt., Wash., Wyo.
1952]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIE IVo
defendants refused them access to the property. Whereupon plaintiffs
brought this action for damages for defendants' refusal to allow entry.
The trial court overruled defendants' demurrer to the complaint, and
they appealed. Held: Reversed. The law of timber deeds, under which
plaintiffs' rights would clearly expire on the precise day named, has no
application in view of the enactment of the Uniform Sales Act, but
with regard to the subsidiary contract between the two buyers time was
of the essence because of the continued reference thereto in the contract,
indicating an intention by the parties that time be so regarded. lens v.
Habeck, 259 Wis. 338, 48 N.W. (2d) 473 (1951).
The first question presented by the principal case is whether the
nursery stock was personal property or real estate coming within the rule
of the so-called "timber cases." The law with regard to timber deeds
and contracts for the sale of standing timber seems to be in hopeless
conflict as between the various states on the problem of the nature of
the interest of the grantee of timber rights." However, the Wisconsin
law (absent the Uniform Sales Act, the effect of which is to be con-
sidered) seems to be fairly well settled. It has been held that a deed of
timber providing that the same shall be removed within a given time
conveyed only so much of the timber as was removed within the time
specified, but that timber cut within that time became personalty and
title to it passed to the grantee, so that he might, within a reasonable
time after the expiration of the date stipulated, go upon the premises
and take the timber.2 In short, it was held that the vendee's right was a
license.3 However, it was entirely possible that the parties could by their
contract elevate the right of the vendee to the status of an interest in
land,4 apparently a profit a prendre (though the Wisconsin Court
refrains from so cataloging it), subject to the condition subsequent that
1A comprehensive survey of the conflicting decisions may be found in the
following series of Notes: 15 A.L.R. 41; 31 A.L.R. 944; 42 A.L.R. 641; 71
A.L.R. 143; 164 A.L.R. 423. No attempt will be made here to explore the
law of this subject outside of Wisconsin.
2 Golden v. Glock, 57 Wis. 118, 15 N.W. 12, 46 Am. Rep. 32 (1883) ; Hicks v.
Smith, 77 Wis. 146, 46 N.W. 133 (1890); Keystone Lmbr. Co. v. Kolman, 94
Wis. 465, 69 N.W. 165, 34 L.R.A. 821, 59 Am. St. Rep. 905 (1896) ; Peshtigo
Lmbr. Co. v. Ellis. 122 Wis. 433, 100 N.W. 834 (1904); Bretz v. R. Connor
Co., 140 Wis. 269, 122 N.W. 717 (1909). In Western L. & C. Co. v. Copper
Riv. Lmbr. Co., 138 Wis. 404, 120 N.W. 277 (1909) a contract was construed
as evincing an intention of the parties to give a period of grace and to allow
the grantee a reasonable time after the date stipulated for removal, the in-
tention being that a failure of strict performance should not work a
forfeiture.3 Keystone Lmbr. Co. v. Kolman, ibid. It has been held by some courts that
where timber is conveyed by a proper deed the grantee takes an implied
easement of necessity to enter and remove the timber. Worthen v. Garno,
182 Mass. 243, 65 N.E. 67 (1902); Pine Tree Lmbr. Co. v. McKinley, 83
Minn. 419, 86 N.W. 414 (1901); Smith v. Va. L.C.&C. Co., 143 Va. 159, 129
S.E. 274 (1925) ; 3 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY (3d ed.) §793.
4Williams v. Jones, 131 Wis. 361, 111 N.W. 505 (1907); Kneeland-McLurg
L. Co. v. Lillie, 156 Wis. 428, 145 N.W. 1093 (1914) (where the Court dis-
tinguishes the cases cited supra, note 2).
[Vol. 35
RECENT DECISIONS
the timber be removed within the time stated5 This rule was applied to
a three party situation as between the vendee of the timber and the
vendor's grantee of the land.
However, the question is raised as to the effect of the Uniform Sales
Act upon these rules. The crucial section provides as follows:
"'Goods' (as used in the Act) include all chattels personal
other than things in action and money. The term includes em-
blements, industrial growing crops, and things attached to and
forming a part of the land which are agreed to be severed
before sale or under the contract of sale."
'7
The question of broad, general scope which immediately presents itself
is, of course, as to whether the statute completely overrules the "timber
cases," or at least modifies their application to a great extent by con-
fining them to cases involving timber as such, excluding such items as
nursery stock. However, it is not the purpose of this. note to investigate
a problem of such magnitude.8 Rather, the precise problem presented
by the principal case is the effect of the Sales Act upon the three-party
arrangement there involved, conceding the applicability of the "timber
cases" in the absence of the Act.
Assuming, therefore, that the Sales Act operates upon the nursery
stock (or other growing crop) by virtue of the phrase including "indus-
trial growing crops" (i.e., fructus industriales) within the definition of
5 Schmidt v. Almon, 181 Wis. 244, 194 N.W. 168 (1923).
6 Strasson v. Montgomery, 32 Wis. 52 (1873).
7 Wis. STATS. (1949), Sec. 121.76(1) [U.S.A., Sec. 76(1)].
8 By assuming for the purposes of this article that the Uniform Sales Act
definition of "goods" (WIs. STATS. (1949), Sec. 121.76(1); U.S.A. Sec. 76(1))
was sufficient in scope to modify or change the rule of the "timber cases,"
the writer does not intend to minimize the problem presented. The Wisconsin
Court in the principal case rather summarily held "that the Uniform Sales
Act has changed the law in Wisconsin so that industrial growing crops,
growing trees and other nursery stock 'attached to or forming a part of
the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract
of sale' are to be considered 'goods' and are consequently personal property;
and that as the nursery stock was personal property, the so-called 'timber
cases' in Wisconsin are not applicable." There are several arguments against
this position, which may briefly be stated as follows: 1) The phrase "indus-
trial growing crops" and the word "emblements" in section 121.76 refer tofructus indistriales, which are defined as annual crops which owe their
existence to the cultivation of man (BALLANTINE'S LAWv DICTIONARY, pp. 429
and 533), and trees and nursery stock are not annual crops; 2) The phrase
in section 121.76 regarding "things attached to or forming a part of the
land" refers not to living things at all, but to fixtures and buildings, because
of the express enumeration with regard to living things; 3) Statutes in
derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, and a failure to
specifically include trees and nursery stock along with emblements andfructus industriales indicates an intention not to affect the "timber cases." See
also Schaap v. Wolfe, 173 Wis. 351, 181 N.W. 214 (1921) (decided 10 years
after the adoption of the Sales Act, where the Court followed the "timber
cases" without reference to the Sales Act) ; Schmidt v. Almon, 181 Wis. 244,
194 N.W. 168 (1923) (regarding the taxability of trees as realty) ; Nelson &
Sons Co. v. Dept. of Finance, 365 Ill. 401, 6 N.E. (2d) 632 (1937); 1
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §117.
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personal property, no problem seems to be present under the facts of the
principal case with respect to the contract entered into between the
original landowner and the buyer of the crop. The Sales Act governed.
Assuming further that by that contract title to the crop vested in the
buyer,9 obviously title to the land sans crop passed to the buyer of the
real estate, whereas, under the rule of the "timber cases," title to the
land and crop would have gone to the buyer of the land (subject to the
right of removal in the buyer of the crop and his ability to gain title
thereby), since the buyer of the crop could gain no title to it before
severance from the land.
But an application of the Sales Act to the original contracts of
purchase is quite another thing from an application of the law of sales
with respect to time conditions to the subsidiary contract entered into
by the two buyers as to the right of and time for removal. It is obvious
that that contract was not a sale, for as between themselves and in
relation to the growing crop, the buyer of the land and the buyer of the
crop were not in a seller-buyer relationship. They might have occupied
such relation under the "timber cases," where the buyer of the land
assumed title to the crop until cut.'0 Under the Sales Act, it would seem
that the parties assumed the status of licensor and licensee, in much the
same manner that before the Sales Act a two party contract resulted in
that relationship," with the exception that, under the Act, title to the
crop as a chattel interest initially rested in the licensee.' 2 As such, the
license would be, unlike the pre-Sales Act situation, irrevocable since
coupled with an interest,'3 but strictly limited to the time prescribed.' 4
There is no post-Sales Act case on this situation'9 (other than the prin-
cipal case), but the cases involving two party agreements for the sale of
chattels upon the vendor's land, in so far as they hold that an irrevocable
0 Wis. STATS. (1949), Secs. 121.18, 121.19, especially Sec. 121.19(1) (U.S.A.,
Secs. 18, 19).
'0 Supra, notes 2 and 6.
"Keystone Lmbr. Co. v. Kolman, supra, note 2.
12 Supra, notes 7 and 9.
23The doctrine of licenses, and the proposition that when they are coupled
with an interest they are irrevocable, has been applied in situations involving
a sale of chattels remaining on the vendor's premises. Walker Furn. Co. v.
Dyson, 32 App. D.C. 90, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 606 (1908); Parker v. Barlow,
93 Ga. 700, 21 S.E. 213 (1894) (holding that upon the sale of cut timber
lying upon the vendor's land, no time for removal being mentioned, the
buyer had an irrevocable license to enter within a reasonable time and re-
move it); Rogers v. Cox, 96 Ind. 157, 49 Am. Rep. 152 (1884) ; 3 TIFFANY
ON REAL PROPERTY (3d -ed.) §835; 33 C.J.S. LIcENsEs §92. Compare the
theory of easement of necessity, supra, note 3.
14 The Wisconsin "timber cases," supra, notes 2 and 6, despite any effect the
Uniform Sales Act might have with regard to their specific application to
timber sales, are still authority for the proposition that a license is absolutely
terminated at the date specified. See, especially, Keystone Lmbr. Co. v.
Kolman supra note 2. See also Purdom Naval Stores Co. v. Knight, 129
Ga. 590, 59 S.1. 433 (1907).
25 Strasson v. Montgomery, supra, note 6, antedates the Sales Act by 38 years.
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license to enter and remove the subject of the sale, provides a close
analogy, title to the chattel in both instances being in the licensee-
vendee.1' Under this view of the case, it appears that the ultimate de-
cision of the Wisconsin Court in the principal case was right, at least
upon authority, for the law of licenses is uniform to the effect that when
a termination date is stipulated by the parties the license terminates at
that time,' 7 without regard to any question of time being or not being
of the essence.
Rut the Wisconsin Court did not base its decision upon the law of
licenses, no mention of them being made in the decision. The Court felt
it necessary to determine whether time was of the essence of the con-
tract, and thus it would appear that it felt the law of contracts, or
possibly more particularly the law of sales, applied. It would be well,
therefore to consider the Court's holding with regard to time conditions
in non-land contracts.
When it is said that time is of the essence of a contract it is meant
that performance on or before the date set by- the terms of the contract
is so material that the slightest deviation in performance will amount,
not only to a mere breach for which the promisor must respond in
damages, but to a material breach which excuses the other party from
performance and precludes the promisor from enforcing the contract."8
With regard to contracts for the sale of land it is well settled in
Wisconsin, and indeed most everywhere, that time will not be regarded
as of the essence by the mere inclusion in the contract of a date for
performance, unless it is clear that the parties intended to make it so.19
The presence or absence of a further statement expressly providing that
time is to be so regarded,2 0 or stipulating as to the effect of a failure to
perform on the date stated,21 is important. The question is essentially
one of fact to be answered by a consideration of "the surrounding facts
and circumstances, the situation of the parties, and the acts of the parties
with respect to the subject matter," 22 This doctrine, which had its origin
in equity and developed because of equity's proverbial abhorrence of a
forfeiture, is today applicable both in actions at law and in suits in
equity.23
With regard to mercantile contracts, time historically was of the
16 Supra note 13.
1,Supra, note 14.
Is 3WLLisTON ON CONTRACrS §846.
19 Hoffman v. Danielson, 251 Wis. 34, 27 N.W. (2d) 759 (1947).
20 Hermansen v. Slatter, 176 Wis. 476, 187 N.W. 177 (1922).
21 Buntrock v. Hoffman, 178 Wis. 5, 189 N.W. 572 (1922).
22 Ibid.




essence of every contract, at least in actions at law." However, it has
been suggested that this rule has been greatly modified and indeed
superceded by the equitable rule applicable to land contracts.2 And the
Uniform Sales Act is said to have had a profound effect upon the old
rule in situations involving installment contracts by its provisions against
forfeiture upon breach of time conditions.2 6 The Restatement of
Contracts has applied the equity rule of land contracts to mercantile
contracts to the extent of providing that time is not of the essence of
such contracts by the mere inclusion of a date for performance, but
suggesting, however, that time is generally more material in mercantile
than in land contracts.27 The Restatement does not make time of the
essence as a matter of law by the mere fact of its being mentioned, but
rather looks to the facts, one of which is the subject matter of the
contract.
It would appear that the basis for the distinction historically made
between land and mercantile contracts lies in the subject matter of them.
Land values are relatively stable, and, in the absence of special circum-
stances, whether performance is had today or tomorrow seems im-
material, as long as perfomance is rendered in a reasonable time. In
these situations the courts of equity, from an early date, and later the
courts of law refused to raise an irrebutable presumption that time was
of the essence. However, the exact opposite may be true of some
mercantile contracts where the subject matter is subject to sudden
fluctuations in value, as is the case in contracts involving securities. In
these situations the courts, at least the law courts, seemed less reluctant
to create an irrebutable presumption. There is little question but that in
many mercantile situations time is of the utmost materiality. However,
the presence of that factor in some of these contracts does not seem to
justify a blanket rule applicable to all such contracts, including those
involving commodities as stable as land (such as the growing trees with
which the principal case is concerned). Under an extension of the land
rule to mercantile contracts, certainly the fluctuating value of the subject
matter would be a special circumstance to be considered by the jury in
determining the fact of the materiality of time. This principle has been
recognized by courts tending to break away from the old common law
rule. In Farris v. Ferguson, an action at law by the seller for breach
of a contract for the sale of animals and farm produce, where the buyer
24Kieckhefer Box Co. v. John Strange Paper Co., 180 Wis. 367, 189 N.W. 145,
193 N.W. 487 (1923); 2 WILUSTON ON SALES §453a.
25 Ibid.
26 WIS. STATS. (1949), Sec. 121.45(2) (U.S.A., Sec. 45(2)); Kieckhefer Box Co.
v. John Strange Paper Co., supra, note 24.
27 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §276.
2- 146 Tenn. 498, 242 S.W. 873, 23 A.L.R. 624 (1922).
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refused to accept payment a day after the stipulated date, the Court
said, in reversing a judgment for the defendant:
* . the growing tendency has been to modify the harsh and
often inequitable rule of the common law, and the courts now
determine each case upon its own peculiar facts, the question
as to whether time is of the essence of the contract being one of
construction controlled by the intention of the parties."
The Court pointed to fluctuating values and the possibility of loss, in-
convenience or injury to a party by the short delay as considerations in
determining the question of fact as to time.
The New York Appellate Term, in affirming a judgment for the
plaintiff seller in an action at law for breach of a contract in the buyer's
refusal to accept brick delivered one day late, said :29
"The rule that time is to be regarded of the essence was ori-
ginally designed to carry out the presumed intention of the
parties. When it is clear that the application of this rule would
be contrary to the intention of the parties, the reason for the
application of the rule no longer exists, and the rule itself is
inoperative. The adoption of a reasonable construction, which
gives effect to the original intention of the parties, is more in
harmony with the spirit and reason of the general rule than is
adherence to a narrow and literal interpretation, which does not
effectuate such intention."30
Other jurisdictions, 31 including the 7th Federal Circuit, in a case coming
out of Illinois, 2 have reached the same conclusions, overthrowing the
old rule and adopting an equity approach 3 without the aid of a statute.
In some states statutes have adopted the liberal rule for application to
all contracts in all actions. 34
Before the principal case, Wisconsin law appeared to be in accord
with this liberal view. The Wisconsin Court seemed to recognize that
- New Jersey Co. v. Nathaniel Wise Co., 55 Misc. 294, 105 N.Y.S. 231 (1907),
affirmed by memorandum, 125 App. Div. 918, 109 N.Y.S. 1139 (1908). See
also Hubbard v. Rockaway Lunch Co., 131 Misc. 53, 225 N.Y.S. 638 (1928).
30 It is to be noted that this court would not go the full length and adopt the
equity land rule, which is apresumption against time being of the essence,
but rather would adopt a contrary presumption, requiring evidence that
time was not of the essence in personalty cases. The significant fact, how-
ever, is that the court discards the irrebutable presumption raised by the
common law.
31 See Bowser & Co. v. Crescent Filling Station, 133 S.C. 281, 130 S.E. 870(1926) where the court determined time was of the essence, but on a con-
sideration of all the facts and circumstances; Hernton v. Manger, 85 Mont.
31, 277 P. 433 (1929).
32 Colonial Sugars Co. v. Durand, 286 F. 499 (7th Cir., 1923).33 Equity traditionally applied the same rule to land and mercantile contracts.
Consolidated Boiler Corp. v. Bogue Electric Co., 141 N.J.Eq. 550, 58 A. (2d)
759 (1950). See also 2 WILLISTON ON SALES §453a.
34 GA. CIVIL CODE, Sec. 4268(8) ; Cobb Lmbr. Co. v. Sunny South Grain Co., 36
Ga. App. 140, 135 S.E. 759 (1927); Herring Motor Co. v. Behn, 38 Ga. App.
756, 145 S.E. 474 (1928). The Uniform Sales Act has adopted the liberal
view to installment situations, see supra, note 26.
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time would not be of the essence as a matter of law merely because a
time for performance was set in the contract and the contract was one
involving personal property. In a case35 concerning a contract for the
sale of tavern fixtures and a stock of merchandise wherein the buyer
refused to perform because of the seller's delay in performance, the
Court held:
"A contract may not be rescinded for every breach thereof.
A breach of a contract not so substantial as to defeat the object
of the parties in making the contract does not entitle the other
party to rescind. If time were of the essence of this contract,
then failure to deliver possession on May 5th would have been a
material breach of the contract that would have warranted a
recission. From the record here we must find that time was not
of the essence and that there was not a breach of the agreement
by the plaintiffs that warranted recission of the contract by the
defendants."
It is interesting to note that this case was decided only a few months
before the principal case. It certainly indicates a rejection of the ab-
solute presumption raised by the common law and a willingness to accept
the equitable rule. At law and in equity an examination beyond the
terms of the contract is, or has been, required. The mere mention of a
performance date was insufficient, per se, to establish time as of the
essence as a matter of law.
The principal case, an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer,
now holds as a matter of law and without reference to "surrounding
facts and circumstances," which indeed have yet to be shown, that the
mention four times in a contract of a last date for the performance of
four specified acts, without other provision as to the effect of non-
performance by that date upon the rights of the parties, rendered time
of the essence so that the plaintiff, tendering performance three days
after it was due, had breached the contract to the degree that the
defendant was entitled to a recission. The Court said:
"That time was of the essence as to the matters which were to
be performed by plaintiffs is clearly evident in view of the express
and definite provisions in the contract...,,16
The effect of the decision may well be a reverter to the old common
law rule, for there is nothing beyond the mere mention of time upon
which to base the holding. There are three possible qualifications which
might be attached to the decision, however. The first is that time was
mentioned four times, but there is no case holding that mere repeated
reference to time will make it of the essence, especially where, as here,
the promisor had four separate acts to perform. The second is that the
35 Kampmann v. Mcnerney, 258 Wis. 432, 46 N.W. (2d) 205 (1951).
36 Jens v. Habeck, 259 Wis. 338, 48 N.W. (2d) 473 (1951).
[Vol. 35
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promisor had no real excuse for non-performance, but the reference to
this point in the Court's opinion seems to be merely in passing and the
decision actually based upon the mention of time in the contract.
Thirdly, the rule of this case might be limited to actions at law and the
rule in equity, heretofore applied to law, left unaffected. But the con-
clusion seems inescapable that a change has been worked in the Wis-
consin law of time conditions.
It is to be noted that, assuming the applicability of the Sales Act to
the original contract between the landowner and the buyer of the crop by
virtue of the provision including "industrial growing crops" as goods,
the decision in the case necessarily works a forfeiture of the crop
owner's interest, for under the Act title to the crop passed to him upon
the execution of the contract." The benefit of the trees passes to the
landowner, who did not include the value thereof in his purchase price
for the land. This results in an unjust enrichment to him, and is a
controlling distinction between the situation under the Sales Act and
under the "timber cases," and it follows whether the decision be ration-
alized under the principles of the law of licenses or of the law of sales
with respect to the subsidiary contract between the two buyers. An
opposite result as regards a forfeiture is reached under the rule of the
"timber cases," where the grantee of timber rights is limited to such
timber as he can remove in the time specified. Never having had title
to any additional amount, a technical forfeiture, which presupposes an
interest which would continue if not cut off, is prevented. The dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brown in the principal case vigorously opposes
any result which would work an unreasonable forfeiture :38
"For a failure to remove the stock by a designated time, which
was not stated to be of the essence and which has not even been
found to be material, the defendants propose to acquire without
compensation that which they recognized was sold to the
plaintiffs. It seems inequitable to sustain their position, and thus
impose a forfeiture upon the plaintiffs, before the materiality of
the date and the detriment to the defendants of delay have been
passed upon after submission of evidence."
In conclusion, then, two grounds of objection to the rather brief and
summary opinion of the Court are submitted (aside from any question
of the general effect of the Sales Act upon the "timber cases") : 1) The
failure of the Court to investigate with more particularity the applic-
ability of the law of licenses to the subsidiary contract between the two
buyers (upon the assumption that the Sales Act governed the original
37 Supra, note 9.38 Supra, note 36 (dissenting opinion).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
sale of the crop); and 2) The harsh rule as to time conditions adopted
by the Court (upon the assumption that the law of contracts or sales
and not licenses governed).
ROBERT F. BODEN
Wills-Revocation by Cancellation-Use of Lead Pencil as In-
dicating Testator's Intent.-The will as found amongst the personal
effects of the testatrix contained certain penciled notations in her hand-
writing. In the residuary clause, which left all the residue to three
cousins, she drew a pencil line through the phrase "Nellie Curtis of
Waupaca" and at the end of the paragraph she wrote the word "dead."
She failed, however, to do anything to the last line of the clause which
read, "the last three named legatees are my first cousins." The con-
tention of the contestant was that the bequest to Nellie Curtis had been
revoked. The lower court admitted the will to probate with the ex-
ception of the bequest to Nellie Curtis. Held: Reversed. Such markings
do not raise a presumption of revocation by cancellation and therefore
the residuary clause as admitted to probate should include the bequest
to Nellie Curtis. In re Holcombe's Estate, 259 Wis. 642, 49 N. W. (2d)
914 (1951).
In general, because of the danger of fraud, the separate states have
enacted statutes providing specific requirements necessary to revoke a
will. These statutes are generally similar and provide for revocation by
physical acts done to the will, by a subsequent revoking instrument, and
by certain changes in circumstances.' The Wisconsin statute, so far as it
applies to revocation by physical acts, provides:
"No will nor any part thereof shall be revoked unless by burning,
tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the same, with the intention of
revoking it... 2
By express language of the statute both an act of destruction plus a
concurrent intention to revoke by that act are required.
Thus once a will has been proven to have been validly executed, it
will be presumed that it continued unrevoked and the primary burden
of proving a subsequent revocation rests upon the one asserting it.3
However, it is generally agreed that where the will is found amongst
the testator's effects in such a state of mutilation or cancellation as
would be a sufficient act of revocation if the intent to revoke were
shown, then from the doing of such act the intent to revoke will be
1 ATKINSON ON WILLS, p. 368.
2 WIS. STATS. (1949), Sec. 228.14.
3 2 PAGE ON WILLS, p. 718.
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